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STUDENT COMMENTS
INSURANCE PROTECTION AGAINST CIVIL
DEMONSTRATIONS
Since the summer of 1964, Negro communities in eight large cities have
experienced mob violence resulting in widespread damage.' The most recent
of these outbursts occurred in the Watts section of Los Angeles. In an area
covering forty-six square miles, the cost of property destruction approximated
forty million dollars. 2 The purpose of this comment is to examine the insur-
ance ramifications of such civil demonstrations.
From an insurance point of view, the first obstacle faced by a property
owner in a district prone to civil demonstrations is the possible unavailability
of insurance in the event that insurers anticipate a recurrence of violence.
Although it has been asserted that owners of private homes and business
establishments in these areas have experienced little difficulty in obtaining
policies,° there are indications to the contrary. One Los Angeles insurance
agent has charged that businessmen in that city are faced with the decision
of many first-line insurance companies to refuse to write policies in southern
Los Angeles.4 Similar problems have been reported in other racially tense
cities.° Moreover, one who has succeeded in obtaining a policy in these areas
is not secure. The same threat of violence which has led underwriters to refuse
to issue new policies has reportedly caused cancellation and refusal to renew
existing policies!' And, even where policies are made generally available,
insurers have yet another means by which they can avoid assuming the risk of
civil demonstrations. They can make it financially impractical for a property
owner to pay the insurer's rates for covering those risks. While it has been
suggested that the incidence of prohibitive rates has been minimal,' reports
from Philadelphia, New York, and southern Los Angeles indicate the con-
trary.8
Assuming that the property owner has been able to obtain a policy at
reasonable rates, he faces yet another obstacle in the possible operation of
the exclusion clause. The standard fire policy covers all fire damage, including
that caused by riot.° If the assured desires additional protection, the "extended
coverage plan" insures against all non-fire losses, even those caused by riot."
1 Governor's Comm'n on the Los Angeles Riots, Violence in the City—An End or a
Beginning? at 2 (1965).
2 State of California, Department of Insurance Press Release, Aug. 20, 1965.
8
 State of California, Department of Insurance Press Release, Sept. 21, 1965.
4 N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1965, p. 16, col. 8.
6 Boston Herald, Oct. 3, 1965, p. 7, col. 6.
6 Elizabeth Daily Journal (N.J.), Oct. 6, 1965; Wall Street Journal, Oct. 4, 1965,
p. 14, col. 3.
7 State of California, Department of Insurance Press Releases, Sept. 2, 1965 & Nov.
22, 1965.
8 Boston Herald, supra note 5; Wall Street Journal, supra note 6; N.Y. Times, supra
note 4.
0 E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 99 (1958).
10 Extended Coverage Endorsement No. 4, Uniform Standard New England Form
No. 758 (1962).
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However, in both the standard fire policy and the extended coverage plan, and
in any policy obtainable," there is a clause excluding the insurer's liability if
the loss results from insurrection. 12 Hence the problem of the policyholder
becomes clear: is the outburst a riot, making the insurer liable, or is it an
insurrection, as this term is used in the exclusion clause?
A "riot" is generally said to have occurred when two or more persons
have joined in committing an act, lawful or unlawful, in a violent or tumul-
tuous manner.ia Most of the cases, however, further require that the tumult
have a private objective," such as the destruction of the property of an
individual,' 5 as opposed to a public objective. In the latter case the violence
is directed against society or civil authority, such as an organized rebellion
against the government." Even when it is established that the objective of
the group was the settlement of a private quarrel, a riot cannot be said to have
occurred unless the result or effect of this settlement is a public disturbance. 17
For example, if two or more persons secretly break into a home at night and
destroy some property, no riot will have taken place unless these actions
terrified the general populace or in some way produced a public disturbance.Is
Hence a riot can be defined as the activity of two or more persons acting in
pursuit of a private objective resulting in public turmoil.
A difficulty often arises in determining whether public turmoil has
resulted from a private or a public objective. Violence aimed at the settlement
of a labor dispute," or an attempt to prevent a business enterprise from
operating,2° is clearly privately motivated. Other cases pose difficulties. In
Commonwealth v. Runnels, 21 a group of about fifty persons attacked a public
town house, seized the ballot boxes, and prevented the holding of an election.
And in United States v. Stewart, 22 the defendants used violence to thwart the
mayor's efforts to have the polls opened. In both criminal actions, the court
held that a riot had occurred. Since opposition to the voting process would
appear to be directed against society or government, it can be argued that
these outbursts had public objectives and hence were not riots. However,
neither court discussed the public-private dichotomy. A -possible reason for
11 Although insurers are generally authorized to insure against such risks as war
and insurrection, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175, § 47 (1932), as a practical matter they
usually do not do so. Vance, Insurance § 153, at 871 (3d ed. 1951).
12 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 99 (1958) ; Extended Coverage Endorsement
No. 4, Uniform Standard New England Form No. 758 (1962).
13 Walter v. Northern Ins. Co., 370 Ill. 283, 286, 18 N.E.2d 906, 907 (1939) ; Idaho
Code Ann. § 18-6401 (1947).
14
 "It seems to be agreed that the injury or grievance complained of and intended
to be revenged or remedied by a riotous assembly must relate to some private quarrel
only . . . ." Salem Mfg. Co. v. First American Fire Ins. Co., 111 F.2d 797, 802 (9th Cir.
1940).
15 Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 132 Ky. 7, 116 S.W. 234 (1909).
16 Boon v. Aetna Ins. Co., 40 Conn. 575, 584 (1874).
17
 Commonwealth v. •Zwierzelewski, 177 Pa. Super. 141, 146, 110 A.2d 757, 760
(1954),
78
 Walter v. Northern Ins. Co., supra note 13, at 291, 18 N.E.2d at 910.
18 Insurance Co. of North America v. Rosenberg, 25 F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1928).
20 Commonwealth v. Paul, 145 Pa. Super. 548, 554, 21 A.2d 421, 423 (1941).
21 10 Mass. 518 (1813).
22 27 Fed. Cas. 1339 (No. 16401a) (C.C.D. Pa. 1818).
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this, other than their rejection of this dichotomy as a test, could be that it
was clear to the court that the objectives of the violence were in fact not
public. If in Runnels and Stewart the prevention of the elections was moti-
vated by the participants' desire for personal revenge against those conduct-
ing the elections, then it would seem that the court could find riot and still
observe the requirement of a private objective. But the underlying objectives
were not mentioned. The Runnels court emphasized the combination of two
or more participants23 while the Stewart court treated this factor plus the
element of a public disturbance.24 If these cases did reject a private objective
requirement, then it would appear that a riot is any assembly of two or more
who act in such a way that members of the general public become terrified.
As will be seen, while such a definition may suffice in a criminal proceeding,
it is of little value in an insurance context, where the issue is not "riot or no
riot," as in Runnels and Stewart, but rather "riot or insurrection." When it
becomes necessary to distinguish between riot and insurrection, the private
objective requirement for riot should be retained. Otherwise the definition of
riot could in many instances easily encompass what should technically be
termed an insurrection. By limiting the definition of riot to the use of violence
to settle a private quarrel, and by defining insurrection as the violent mani-
festation of a public objective, we adopt the only test available which draws
a workable distinction between riot and insurrection. .
The term "insurrection" has been defined generally as an armed assembly
of persons rising in opposition to established government or lawful authority.25
This definition raises the fundamental question of the nature of the opposition
required. One aspect of the problem is whether incidental or indirect opposition
to government is sufficient. In In re Charge to Grand Jury," the defendants
were charged with willfully obstructing the execution of the mail transportation
laws in so formidable a way as "for the time being to defy the authority of the
United States."27 This obstruction was held to be an insurrection which was
defined as a "rising against civil or political authority,—the open and active
opposition of a number of persons to the execution of law in a city or state." 28
This holding is subject to criticism since the defendants were involved in a
local labor disagreement in which the court suggests that personal ambition
and the satisfaction of private malice might have been the motivating factors.
It could be inferred from this that the defendants did not have the public ob-
jective of attacking some phase of society or government, but rather were
engaged in a private quarrel. The ensuing violence should then be termed a riot,
not an insurrection. For, unless it is accepted that insurrection must involve
direct opposition to the official acts of government, rather than the mere inci-
dental resistance to such acts which may stand in the way of a private goal,
any distinction between insurrection and riot is lost. It is difficult to conceive
of a "riot" where the violence does not in some way result in resistance to
23 Commonwealth v. Runnels, supra note 21, at 519.
24 United States v. Stewart, supra note 22, at 1343.
Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, 399, 183 S.E. 13, 20 (1935).
26 62 Fed. 828 (ND. III. 1894).
27 Id. at 830.
28 Ibid.
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the execution of some law, even if it be only the law against breaching the
peace or malicious mischief. The determination of insurrection should be
governed, therefore, by an analysis of the public nature of the group's basic
objective rather than by an observation of the incidental effects of any
outburst.
If, then, the opposition must be direct, to what end must it be directed?
It has been assumed thus far that any direct violence against government or
society would be sufficient and that it is not necessary to have a movement
which seeks to overthrow the government. Some cases support this assump-
tion,ss while, on the other hand, there is authority requiring a specific intention
to overthrow the government 30
 This conflict must be resolved in order to
determine when the exclusion clause in an insurance contract will become
operative. An analysis of the conflicting cases is unlikely to yield the desired
resolution since they do not satisfactorily set out the reasons for their choices.
The more fruitful approach to this question, therefore, is a determination of
why an insurance company would insert "insurrection" into an exclusion
clause and why the legislature might allow the insurer to do so.
There seems little doubt that the major consideration leading an insurer
to refuse to undertake the risk of damage resulting from direct violence against
the government, i.e., an insurrection, is the probability that extensive destruc-
tion will results' An analysis of the elements of antigovernmental activity
which are likely to lead .to this destruction is relevant to the issue of the
direction which opposition to society or government must take in an insur-
rection. The participants are likely to have a sense of unity, at least in terms
of singleness of purpose. Some may be moved by such fanatical desire that
checking them will be nearly impossible. They will probably have done
some planning to insure that their movement will come by surprise. The
result will be systematic destruction and paralysis of the local police
force, prolonging the period of destruction. Another element to be con-
sidered is the form which the government's counterattack is likely to take.
In the interest of containing the outburst as a whole, government forces may
find it necessary to allow property in some areas to be destroyed by the insur-
gents in order to cut off the progress of the movement into other areas. By
concentrating the counterattack in areas not yet reached by the insurgents,
government forces such as the National Guard may have to abandon any
hope of protecting property in those districts which the insurgents have been
able to, dominate. In addition, these forces may find it necessary to engage in
destruction of property themselves in order to prevent further violence. For
example, apprehension of the insurgents may require the use of firearms, fire
hoses, and tear gas in areas where private property is likely to be damaged
in the process. All of the factors listed above must necessarily lead to wide-
29
 Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 924, 930 (No. 5127) (C.C.D. Fa. 1800); In re Charge
to Grand Jury, supra note 26; Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 601, 77 S.E. 1029, 1043
(1913).
30
 Home Ins: Co. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731, 736 (1st Cir. 1954); cf. Spruill v. North
Carolina Mut, Life Ins. Co., 46 N.C. 126,127 (1853).
31
 Home Ins. Co. v. Davila, supra note 30, at 735; Vance, supra note 11.
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spread destruction of property and hence to potentially ruinous insurance
claims.
It seems quite clear that these factors of destruction are very likely to
appear when the movement seeks to overthrow the government. It may,
however, be inaccurate to suggest that they are peculiar to such movements.
If the objective of an outburst is to display opposition to a foreign policy, an
unjust law, or an unjust social order made possible by governmental action or
inaction, then it is likely that the participants will be as fanatical and unified,
and hence as destructive, as when they seek to overthrow the government.
There appears, therefore, to be no reason to say that when insurers excluded
insurrection from coverage they meant to limit the exclusion merely to out-
bursts aimed at overthrowing the government.
The insurer's purpose in excluding insurrection is relevant to the ques-
tion of whether an intention to overthrow the government is necessary only if
the government which regulates the business of insurance shares that purpose.
Legislatures are opposed to an underwriter's assumption of risks which may
lead to insolvency and his consequent inability to pay claims. 82 Clearly a
narrowing of the concept of insurrection to an intention to overthrow the
government increases the chances of liability for the ruinous payments which
the exclusion clause is designed to avoid. It is submitted, therefore, that the
reason for the existence of the clause, both from the point of view of insurance
companies and legislatures, militates against the adoption of the narrow
definition.
An additional reason for concluding that the term insurrection embraces
both events is that violence opposing a law or governmental policy may be as
unforeseeable as violence directed toward overthrowing the government. In
order for insurers to set rates that bear some reasonable relationship to the
risk assumed, as legislatures demand they must," actuarial departments must
be able to calculate the frequency and intensity with which the insured event
will occur. One major reason for including an event in the exclusion clause is
the difficulty of making this calculation due to the unpredictability of that
event." The manifestation of opposition to society or government through
violence, i.e., an insurrection, is such an event. This element of unpredict-
ability exists not only when the movement seeks to overthrow the govern-
ment, but also when its target is an allegedly unwise and unjust law or social
order. For this reason, the term insurrection should include both movements.
Traditionally, insurers have not provided protection against the risks
incident to direct opposition to government a5
 This may be the result of a
feeling that it is the responsibility of government to assume those risks. If
there is merit to the argument that the responsibility of government to
32 E.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 1852(a) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 174A, § 5(a) (2)
(1958).
33 Del. Code Ann. tit. 18 § 2303(a) (3) (1953) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 48.19.030(3)
(1961).
84 3 Richards, Insurance § 512, at 1663 (5th ed. 1952) ; Vance, supra note 11.
85
 Home Ins. Co. v. Davila, supra note 30 (insurrection, rebellion, war) ; Spruill v.
North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 30 (invasion, insurrection, usurped
authority).
710
STUDENT COMMENTS
prevent opposition to its existence is a factor which would lead an insurer to
decline to offer coverage for such opposition, then no reason is seen for limit-
ing the concept of opposition to an intention to overthrow the government.
Was the outburst in Watts a riot or an insurrection? Was it the activity
of two or more pursuing a private objective resulting in a public disturbance,
or was it a movement with a public objective directed against government, its
laws, or an unjust social order? It has been suggested that the violence had no
objective other than destruction for its own sake." Apparently much of the
agitation stemmed from a Negro's resistance to arrest for reckless driving 37
and from a claim that a pregnant Negro woman had been abused by the
police 38 The fact that a good deal of the damage was inflicted upon white-
owned establishments" may indicate the Negro participants' grudges against
the white owners for alleged unfair dealings. Insofar as the above would lead
to the conclusion that the violence was a manifestation of private objectives,
such as the desires to be destructive or to seek revenge against individuals, the
outburst may be considered a riot.
However, other aspects of the outburst indicate that what may have
begun as the settlement of private quarrels became something more than a
riot. Although there is little evidence of a pre-established plan of destruction,
the sudden appearance of Molotov cocktails in quantity and the
unexplained movement of men in cars through the areas of great
destruction support the conclusion that there was organization and
planning after the ... [outburst] commenced."
To the extent that this planned violence, however unsophisticated it may have
been, was directed toward what the participants considered an oppressive
government or an unjust social order, an insurrection may have occurred.
A good deal of the destruction of private property can be interpreted as
the manifestation of a feeling that the structure of society denies full citizen-
ship to Negroes. Inadequate education,41 consumer exploitation42 and job
discrimination" must certainly give rise to this feeling. When, in November
of 1964, an overwhelming majority of the voters repealed by initiative the
Rumford Fair Housing Act, this probably was further evidence to the Negro
that society and the government it reflects was basically discriminatory. 44
 The
"resentment, even hatred, of the police, as the symbol of authority,/ 45 is yet
another indication of the conclusion that, however inarticulate the violence
may have been as an expression of protest, it did have as an objective opposi-
39 N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1965, p. 8, col. 5.
37 Governor's Comm'n on the Los Angeles Riots, op. cit. supra note 1, at 10.
38 Id. at 12.
39 N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1965, p. 8, cols. 1 & 7.
49 Governor's Comm'n on the Los Angeles Riots, op. cit. supra note 1, at 22. The
authors have substituted the word "outburst" for "riot." Although the commission called
the Watts outburst a "riot," they were not using this term in a legal sense.
41
 Id. at 49.
42 Id. at 62.
43 Id. at 46.
44
 Id. at 4.
45
 id. at 2.
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tion to society and government. As one commentator put it, the violence was a
"protest against forces which reduce individuals to second-class citizens,
political, cultural, and psychological nonentities . . . . "46
Whether this view of society was justified is irrelevant to the issue of
whether or not there was a violent opposition to the laws of government or to
the structure of society. The existence of an insurrection should not depend
on the political acumen of the insurgents nor on the rightness of their cause.
The only question should be whether there in fact existed direct violent op-
position to government. It is submitted that this question as applied to Watts .
should be answered in the affirmative and that the exclusion clause, as pres-
ently written, should relieve insurers of liability.
At present, insurers do not appear ready to contest their liability for
losses from such demonstrations as occurred in Watts. 47 Nevertheless, in view
of the increasing number of insurance claims arising from civil demonstrations,
insurers may decide to assert the defense of insurrection. Because of this
possibility, solutions to the problem posed by the present form of the exclu-
sion clause should be proposed and examined. Such solutions must presuppose
the existence of a fire policy available at reasonable rates. Only when such
availability is established should the question be raised whether the policy-
holder is able to procure protection which clearly covers civil demonstration
losses. This approach (treating policy availability at reasonable rates before
adequacy of coverage) will be employed below in an examination of the
ability of the insurance industry, the states and, finally, the federal govern-
ment to implement solutions.
The ability of insurers to effect solutions themselves is limited by state
control over the business of insurance. In some areas, states have permitted
insurers to act with a degree of independence; here insurers can effect solu-
tions, subject, of course, to state acquiescence. In other areas, however, the
state has exercised its control to the fulleit; 48 here insurers are restricted to
suggesting solutions. As an example of the former, California insurers have
been considering the voluntary formation of an insurance pool or association
which would provide protection for some of those experiencing difficulty in
securing insurance." This "pool" approach would, of course, be subject to
the same problem which exists absent a pool: the insurers remain the evalu-
ators of insurability 5 6
 Thus, while a voluntary pool makes it somewhat easier
for certain property owners to procure protection, those who are deemed un-
insurable risks by the insurers remain unprotected. 5 '
An example of an area in which the states have exercised their control to
49 Id. at 88.
47 J. Am. Ins., Nov.-Dec., 1965, p. 5.
48 As will be discussed below, rates and policy forms are strictly regulated by the
states. See statutes cited note 62 infra; cases cited note 54 infra.
49
 State of California, Department of Insurance Press Release, Nov. 22, 1965.
59
 This is a "problem" only insofar as it is assumed to be desirable that all property
owners in civil demonstration areas be protected by insurance. Undeniably, insurers'
obligations to their stockholders and policyholders require selection of risks.
51 The factor motivating consideration of a pool might be the same as motivated
the California automobile insurers to form a voluntary pool: if the insurers do not act
themselves, the state will impose its plan upon them.
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the fullest is fire and casualty rate regulation. 52 Insurance industry action in
lowering rates so as to make policy availability more than illusory must satisfy
the various requirements considered in formulating and approving rating
structures."
Any change in the form of the exclusion clause (for example, deletion of
insurrection as an excluded peril) would also be subject to strict state contro1. 54
While the insurance industry could propose clarification or modification of
the exclusion clause, actual changes would depend upon the states.
Turning now to state solutions, the scope of state regulation of insurance
is sufficiently comprehensive to enable a state to require insurers operating
within its boundaries to issue policies to applicants who would be denied pro-
tection by insurers free to choose their own risks. 55 Automobile assigned risk
plans enable certain states to assure protection to residents classified as poor
risks 60 In 1951, the due process objection to California's plan was rejected
by the United States Supreme Court.57 The arguments which were offered by
the automobile insurers may be raised by fire insurers faced with legislative
establishment of assigned risk fire insurance. The defendant insurers argued in
vain—but perhaps not without merit—that the act, in commanding them to
incur liabilities against their will, forced them to undertake risks so abnormal
that financial loss might be expected." The Court found no violation of the
fourteenth amendment, stating that, in its broadest reach, the case "is one in
which the state requires in the public interest each member of a business to
assume a pro rata share of a burden which modern conditions have made inci-
dent to the business."50 Legislation which would establish assigned risk fire
insurance has already been proposed in California" and Pennsylvania."
Although these bills might effectively alleviate the availability problem, the
conspicuous absence of a provision for rates reasonably within the reach of
the property owner could render this protection illusory.
Normally, state insurance commissioners are required by statute to
observe three primary considerations in establishing and approving rate struc-
tures: The solvency of the insurers, nonexcessiveness of the rates, and nondis-
crimination among. applicants posing like risks.82 The nonexcessiveness provi-
sion arguably leaves room for reasonable profit margin. Rates must meet the
test of all of these provisions, and if the property owner is unable to afford the
established rates, he cannot be protected. Perhaps in an assigned risk fire
insurance plan the commissioner should be empowered to set rates which
52
 E.g., N.Y. Ins. Law § 186(2).
53 See statutes cited note 62 infra.
54
 Union Mut. Life Co. v. Bailey, 99 Colo. 570, 575, 64 P.2d 1267, 1269 (1937) ;
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hardison, 199 Mass. 190, 199, 85 N.E. 410, 413 (1908).
55 California State Auto. Ass'n v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 110 (1951).
50
 Cal. Ins. Code §§ 11620-27; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, f§ 113H, 1 (1958);
N.Y. Ins. Law § 63 ; Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 204.51 (1957).
57
 California State Auto. Ass'n v. Maloney, supra note 55.
58
 Id. at 108.
59
 Id. at 109.
00
 Cal. S.B. 1276 (Regular Sess. 1965).
01
 Pa. H.B. 78 (1965 Sess.).
62
 Cal. Ins. Code § 1852(a) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann, ch. 174A, § 5(a)(2) (1958) ;
N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 183(1)(b), (c).
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satisfy solvency considerations but cut into the insurers' profits, bringing
rates within the reach of the low income property owner.
The problem posed by the present exclusion clause could be handled by
legislative modification, or substitution of a new clause which clearly does
not exclude civil demonstration losses." Although it would seem that an
alteration of the exclusion clause might affect the solvency of insurers, the
fact that they are presently paying for civil demonstration losses without
crying insurrection" suggests that present profit margins enable them to
absorb these losses. If these profit margins continue, change should not cause a
solvency problem.
A different approach would be for the states to adopt programs which are
not, strictly speaking, insurance. An illustration of such a program is the pro-
posed California catastrophe insurance fund which would be composed of tax
revenues and premiums paid by residents who desire protection." As men-
tioned previously, rates satisfying the present state requirements might pre-
clude protection because of the inability of the property owner to pay. By
pouring general tax revenues into the fund, the state would in effect subsidize
the cost of this protection."
In United States v. South -Eastern Underwriters Ass'nr the United
States Supreme Court held that the federal government has the power under
the commerce clause of the Constitution to assume the dominant role in insur-
ance regulation. Congress chose not to exercise this power in Section 1 of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act," which declares that it is in the public interest that
regulation of the business of insurance should remain in the hands of the
states. In theory, then, if Congress should so decide, the federal government
could assure availability of insurance and make those rate and exclusion clause
modifications discussed above.
Even under existing laws, some federal action is possible. One federal
solution might take the form of the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956. 69
Although the Congress appropriated no money for the program, it is illustra-
tive of a joint federal-state subsidy of insurance: the act provided for the
establishment of a disaster insurance fund, composed of the assureds' premium
payments and state and federal contributions, from which payments for losses
were to be made. 7° The same reasons underlying passage of the Federal Flood
63
 See Union Mut, Life Co. v. Bailey and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hardison, supra
note 54.
04 J. Am. Ins., supra note 47.
66 Cal. A.B. 1737-40 (Regular Sess. 1965).
66
 Another non-insurance solution might be legislative imposition of direct municipal
liability for civil demonstration damage. See Note, Municipal Liability for Riot Damage,
16 Hastings L.J. 459 (1965).
67 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944).
68 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1964).
GO 70 Stat. 1078 (1956), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2401-21 (1958).
70 Actual premium rates could be less than the rates estimated to be adequate to fund
the program, but in no case could a policy premium be less than 60% of the estimated
rate. Each participating state would have been required to pay one half of the difference
between the actual rate and the estimated rate; the federal government would have paid
the other half. The latest proposal for federal aid to victims of flood damage is the
Disaster Relief Act of 1965, S. 1861, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. '(1965).This program would
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Insurance Act are applicable to civil demonstrations. In both cases there are
potential ruinous losses, the losses affect only a limited area, and these limited
areas can be determined in advance with some degree of accuracy.
The federal antitrust laws, made applicable to the business of insurance
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act,74
 might be used to prevent agreements among
insurers not to insure property in civil demonstration areas. However, a recent
case involving agreements not to insure illustrates the limitations of this ap-
proach." The case involved alleged agreements not to insure the plaintiff
property owner against loss from fire. It was held that the antitrust laws were
not violated, since the effect upon competition in this instance was minimal."
By way of dicta, the court stated that in light of the plaintiff's previous sus-
ceptibility to fire loss and the insurers' obligations to their policy holders,
refusal to insure the plaintiff was not unreasonable. 74 Because of the very
high risk involved in insuring property . susceptible to civil demonstration
damage, insurers may very well be acting reasonably in refusing, even con-
certedly, to insure in such high risk areas.
In conclusion, the authors submit that a legal analysis of a "Watts-type"
outburst by a court may well lead it to the conclusion that such an outburst
constitutes an insurrection. The upshot is that insurance policies now
available do not provide protection against civil demonstrations such as
occurred in Watts. To afford such protection to property owners, we must look
to the states, since federal activity in insurance regulation is curtailed by
McCarran-Ferguson, and because insurers are limited largely to suggestion.
The authors feel that the optimum solution which can be afforded by the
states would be the establishment of state-administered fire insurance assigned
risk plans, with policies clearly covering loss due to civil demonstrations.
ALAN S. GOLDBERG
WILLIAM P. STATSKY
provide an indemnity against loss resulting from major disasters. The federal government
would pay 50% of the loss, the state would pay 25% of the loss, and the property owner
or business concern would assume the remaining 25%.
71 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1964).
72 Ruddy Brooks Clothes, Inc. v. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 195 F.2d 86
(7th Cir. 1952).
78
 Id. at 90.
74 Ibid.
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